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DOES NEW TECHNOLOGY LEAD TO WAR?
by
James John Tritten
The sea services face a technological revolution with state-
of-the-art computers, composite materials, superconductors, and
countless other innovations that have the prospect of changing
the nature of military service and the lives of those who serve.
From time to time, emerging technologies have revolutionized the
very nature of warfare itself --i. e. , not merely changing the
nature of military service and the lives of those who serve but
the very nature of how wars are fought.
The Soviet response to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative
( SDI ) includes statements that a revolution in military affairs
might occur if SDI were ever to be implemented as an operational
program. Strategic planners should not simply dismiss Soviet
rhetoric against new technological innovations such as SDI,
Trident-II, sea-launched cruise missiles, etc. without first
considering the impact of new systems on the campaigns likely to
be fought and the nature of war itself.
For example, although one can argue that improvements in
warhead accuracy planned for the Trident II are actually only
marginal, many critics feel that new technologies will allow the
U.S. Navy to perform different roles and missions than could be
achieved with earlier systems. SDI could lead to new
technologies which would certainly have major impact on the
nature of campaigns to be fought. One can even argue that a
revolution in military affairs would occur with the shift from an
offense-dominant world to a defense-dominant one.
At some point, analysts must scrutinize the Soviet rhetoric
and ascertain what type of signal is being sent to the U.S. Are
the Soviets telling us that the new technology is so upsetting
that they feel this new technology is unacceptable? If so, is
there a risk that military action would be undertaken to prevent
that new technology from being used prior to its being fielded by
us? We all remember the assertive disarmament actions taken by
Israel a few years ago to prevent Irag from attaining a nuclear
weapons capability.
Studies exist that discuss the behavior of nations faced
with new technological threats when already engaged in war. At
least one study exists that looks into how "nations react during
peacetime when a potential adversary develops or acquires a
technological weapon or weapons system that it feels threatens to
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alter the military balance of power."
Examples of such technological innovations are:
(1) British and French rifled handguns
(2) Prussian breech- loading rifles and steel artillery
(3) French application of steam propulsion and screw propellers
(4) French seagoing ironclad fleet
(5) British Dreadnought
(6) French development of submarine as warship
(7) British adaptation of airplane for war
(8) Germany splitting the atom
(9) U.S. monopoly on atomic weapons
(10) U.S. thermonuclear research
(11) Superpower monopoly of nuclear weapons
(12) Superpower development of world-wide nuclear weapons
delivery capability.
The above list reflects a major technological innovation
that was capitalized on by one country during peacetime and whose
presence was known to a potential adversary. When nations know
that such an innovation is taking place and a potential adversary
is about to field a military capability that threatens to upset
the existing military balance--do they go to war to prevent that
unfavorable change?
History tells us that, instead of reacting with preemptive
strikes, nations tend to react in one or more of the following
ways. First, they obtain the technology for themselves through
development, purchase, or espionage. This is the classic action-
reaction Richardson arms race model. Rifled handguns and breech-
loading rifles and steel artillery guickly were adopted by other
nations after their worth was thoroughly demonstrated in battle.
The British adapted steam propulsion and screw propellers more
guickly and over a wider portion of their fleet than did the
French. In 1882 Chile purchased a cruiser from the British that
was superior to any comparable ship in the Royal Navy. Germany
built her own Dreadnoughts The Soviet Union, British, French,
and Chinese have been able to develop their own nuclear weapons
capability and delivery systems.
The second way in which nations actually react when Meed
with a technological innovation by a potential enemy is to negate
that technological advantage through alternative technologies of
their own or by forming political alliances to counterbalance the
technologically superior state. French ironclads were countered
by British armor-piercing shells and coastal defenses. Nuclear
weapons were countered by alliances for a common defense.
A third response is to negotiate with the technologically
superior state to either prevent full implementation of the new
technology or to somehow restore the political balance of power.
China attempted (unsuccessfully) to obtain nuclear weapons
technology from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union uses arms
control negotiations to enter the U.S. defense debate and delay
or prevent new technologies from being fielded. The British
argued in 1945 that new nuclear weapons technologies should be
placed under international controls. They then cemented their
position with the United States thus ensuring access to the
technology. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are attempts to ensure a
balance of power despite ever changing technological advantages.
The final response of nations to potentially dangerous
technology is to do nothing. This option is chosen if nations do
not feel that developing the technology themselves is within
their capabilities or if they are willing to live with the
altered balance of power. There are many examples of nations not
taking advantage of a technology first developed by their own
scientists. As in the case of rifled handguns, breech-loading
riles and steel artillery, the submarine, and the airplane, it
sometimes takes an actual war before nations fully understand the
effect of new technologies causing other nations (or themselves)
to react.
Although a team of German physicists split the atom in late
1938 and this fact was communicated to President Franklin
Roosevelt who responded by forming an interagency advisory
committee, it was not until October 1941 that the United States
government approved atomic weapons research and planning. Sweden
is a classic example of a nation that obviously has the
capability to develop nuclear weapons but chooses not to do so.
There seem to be some major lessons here for strategic
planners attempting to wrestle with the effect of new
technologies on warfare. The first is that nations cannot
prevent the transfer of technology but can merely raise the cost
of such transfers and delay their completion. Historical case
studies of the loss of technologies to enemies in wartime suggest
that we cannot even count on preventing the loss of technology to
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a wartime enemy. The second lesson is that maintaining an
adequate research and development base within the government and
in the private sector are long-term strategic goals that cannot
be sacrificed. Although we should not plan on mobilizing such
resources to come up with critical war-winning new technologies
during actual armed conflict, we need to have that capability
both during peacetime and during an armed conflict to capitalize
on any opportunities.
Third, the decisive role appears to be man in the overall
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man-military technology system. New technologies are developed
and ignored or developed and traded away, or limited, or
developed and misused--all by actions taken by man. This
suggests that the military needs to not only educate superb
technicians but also strategists and planners at the operational
or campaign level of warfare who can understand the nature of new
technologies and advise decisionmakers on their net worth.
Fourth, innovative technologies should be exploited and made
an integral part of our new Competitive Strategies approach to
the long-term competition with the Soviet Union. The Soviets
appear to feel that we have started the third revolution in
military affairs due to the impact of new conventional war
fighting technologies. Are we prepared to manage this
revolution to maximize its benefits?
Finally, history suggests that we should feel free to pursue
all imaginable military technologies without serious fear of
causing a pre-emptive strike against us prior to fielding these
technologies in operational systems. Although assuming that
history will repeat itself is a poor planning assumption, the
historical analogy and extrapolation in this case should be
accepted as long as intelligence analysts are cautioned to still
look for indicators.
NOTES
1. Sir Michael Howard "War and Technology," RUSI - Journal of
the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies , Vol.
132, No. 4, December 1987, pp. 17-22. Professor Howard suggests
that Germany may have been influenced in 1914 and 1939 to
initiate war because of the changing military balance, although
he agrees that there are no mono-causal explanations of war.
2. Dr. Terrence R. Fehner "National Responses to Technological
Innovations in Weapons Systems, 1815 to the Present," Germantown,
MD, History Associates, Inc., January 7, 1986, 79 pp. Historical
examples used herein are taken from this study.
3. CAPT Wayne P. Hughes USN (Ret.), Fleet Tactics: Theory and
Practice , Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986, pp. 202-
204.
4. See an interesting article which argues this point by Rear
Admiral V. Gulin and Captain 1st Rank I. Kondyrev, "Man and
Technology in War," Morskoy Sbornik , No. 3, 1987, pp. 8-12.
5. See a recent article that argues this point by Captain John
Williams, USMC, "The Quantum Leap," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings , Vol. 113, No. 11, November 1987, pp. 63-69.
6. See the recent writings of Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D.
Ogarkov, formerly Chief of the General Staff.
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